Halpern and Pearl introduced a definition of actual causality; Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that computing whether X = x is a cause of Y = y is NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take on only two values) and Σ P 2 -complete in general models. In the final version of their paper, Halpern and Pearl slightly modified the definition of actual cause, in order to deal with problems pointed by Hopkins and Pearl. As we show, this modification has a nontrivial impact on the complexity of computing actual cause. To characterize the complexity, a new family D P k , k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., of complexity classes is introduced, which generalizes the class D P introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (D P is just D P 1 ). We show that the complexity of computing causality under the updated definition is D P 2 -complete. Chockler and Halpern extended the definition of causality by introducing notions of responsibility and blame. The complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame using the original definition of causality was completely characterized. Again, we show that changing the definition of causality affects the complexity, and completely characterize it using the updated definition.
Introduction
There have been many attempts to define causality going back to Hume (1739) , and continuing to the present (see, for example, (Collins, Hall, & Paul 2004; Pearl 2000) for some recent work). The standard definitions of causality are based on counterfactual reasoning. In this paper, we focus on one such definition, due to Halpern and Pearl, that has proved quite influential recently.
The definition was originally introduced in 2001 (Halpern & Pearl 2001) , but then modified in the final journal version (Halpern & Pearl 2005) to deal with problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl (2003) . (For ease of reference, we call these definitions "the original HP definition" and "the updated HP definition" in the sequel.) In general, what can be a cause in both the original HP definition and the updated definition is a conjunction of the form X 1 ← x 1 ∧ . . . ∧ X k ← x k , abbreviated X ← x; what is caused can be an arbitrary Boolean combination ϕ of formulas of the form Y = y. This should be thought of as saying that setting X 1 to x 1 and . . . and setting X k to x k results in ϕ being true. As shown by Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002) and Hopkins (2001) , under the original HP definition, we can always take causes to be single conjuncts. However, as shown by Halpern (2008) , this is not the case for the updated HP definition.
Using the fact that causes can be taken to be single conjuncts, Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002) showed that deciding causality (that is, deciding whether X = x is a cause of ϕ) is NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take on only two values) and Σ P 2 -complete in general models. As we show here, this is no longer the case for the updated HP definition. Indeed, we completely characterize the complexity of causality for the updated HP definition. To do so, we introduce a new family of complexity classes that may be of independent interest. Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1984) introduced the complexity class D P , which consists of all languages L 3 such that there exists a language L 1 in NP and a language L 2 in co-NP such that L 3 = L 1 ∩ L 2 . We generalize this by defining D P k to consist of all languages L 3 such that there exists a language L 1 ∈ Σ P k and a language L 2 ∈ Π P k such that L 3 = L 1 ∩ L 2 . Since Σ P 1 is NP and Π P 1 is co-NP, D P 1 is Papadimitriou and Yannakakis's D P . We then show that deciding causality under the updated HP definition is D P 2 complete. Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1984) showed that a number of problems of interest were D P complete, both for binary and general causal models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a natural problem has been shown to be complete for D P 2 . Although, in general, causes may not be single conjuncts, as observed by Halpern (2008) , in many cases (in particular, in all the standard examples studied in the literature), they are. In an effort to understand the extent to which the difficulty in deciding causality stems from the fact that causes may require several conjuncts, we consider what we call the singleton cause problem; that is, the problem of deciding if X = x is a cause of ϕ (i.e., where there is only a single conjunct in the cause). We show that the singleton cause problem is simpler than the general causality problem (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses): it is Σ P 2 complete for both binary and general causal models. Thus, if we restrict to singleton causes (which we can do without loss of generality under the original HP definition), the complexity of deciding causality in general models is the same under the original and the updated HP definition, but in binary models, it is still simpler under the original HP definition.
Causality is a "0-1" concept; X = x is either a cause of ϕ or it is not. Now consider two voting scenarios: in the first, Mr. G beats Mr. B by a vote of 11-0. In the second, Mr. G beats Mr. B by a vote of 6-5. According to both the original and the updated HP definition, all the people who voted for Mr. G are causes of him winning. While this does not seem so unreasonable, it does not capture the intuition that each voter for Mr. G is more critical to the victory in the case of the 6-5 vote than in the case of the 11-0 vote. The notion of degree of responsibility, introduced by Chockler and Halpern (2004) , does so. The idea is that the degree of responsibility of X = x for ϕ is 1/(k + 1), where k is the least number of changes that have to be made in order to make X = x critical. In the case of the 6-5 vote, no changes have to be made to make each voter for Mr. G critical for Mr. G's victory; if he had not voted for Mr. G, Mr. G would not have won. Thus, each voter has degree of responsibility 1 (i.e., k = 0). On the other hand, in the case of the 11-0 vote, for a particular voter to be critical, five other voters have to switch their votes; thus, k = 5, and each voter's degree of responsibility is 1/6. This notion of degree of responsibility has been shown to capture (at a qualitative level) the way people allocate responsibility (Gerstenberg & Lagnado 2010; Lagnado, Gerstenberg, & Zultan 2013) .
Chockler and Halpern further extended the notion of degree of responsibility to degree of blame. Formally, the degree of blame is the expected degree of responsibility. This is perhaps best understood by considering a firing squad with ten excellent marksmen. Only one of them has live bullets in his rifle; the rest have blanks. The marksmen do not know which of them has the live bullets. The marksmen shoot at the prisoner and he dies. The only marksman that is the cause of the prisoner's death is the one with the live bullets. That marksman has degree of responsibility 1 for the death; all the rest have degree of responsibility 0. However, each of the marksmen has degree of blame 1/10.The complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame using the original definition of causality was completely characterized (Chockler & Halpern 2004; Chockler, Halpern, & Kupferman 2008) . Again, we show that changing the definition of causality affects the complexity, and completely characterize the complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame with the updated definition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant definitions of causality. In Section 3, we briefly review the relevant definitions from complexity theory and define the complexity classes D P k . In Section 4 we prove our results on complexity of causality. Some proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Causal Models and Causality: A Review
In this section, we review the details of Halpern and Pearl's definition of causal models and causality, describing both the original definition and the updated definition. This material is largely taken from (Halpern & Pearl 2005) , to which we refer the reader for further details.
Causal models
A signature is a tuple S = U, V, R , where U is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite set of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a finite nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y . Intuitively, the exogenous variables are ones whose values are determined by factors outside the model, while the endogenous variables are ones whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous variables. A causal model over signature S is a tuple M = S, F , where F associates with every endogenous variable X ∈ V a function F X such that
That is, F X describes how the value of the endogenous variable X is determined by the values of all other variables in U ∪V. If R(Y ) contains only two values for each Y ∈ U ∪ V, then we say that M is a binary causal model.
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model M using a causal network. A causal network is a graph with nodes corresponding to the random variables in V and an edge from a node labeled X to one labeled Y if F Y depends on the value of X. Intuitively, variables can have a causal effect only on their descendants in the causal network; if Y is not a descendant of X, then a change in the value of X has no affect on the value of Y . For ease of exposition, we restrict attention to what are called recursive models. These are ones whose associated causal network is a directed acyclic graph (that is, a graph that has no cycle of edges). Actually, it suffices for our purposes that, for each setting u for the variables in U, there is no cycle among the edges of the causal network. We call a setting u for the variables in U a context. It should be clear that if M is a recursive causal model, then there is always a unique solution to the equations in M , given a context.
The equations determined by {F X : X ∈ V} can be thought of as representing processes (or mechanisms) by which values are assigned to variables. For example, if F X (Y, Z, U ) = Y + U (which we usually write as X = Y + U ), then if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set. This equation also gives counterfactual information. It says that, in the context U = 4, if Y were 4, then X would be 8, regardless of what value X and Z actually take in the real world. That is, if U = 4 and the value of Y were forced to be 4 (regardless of its actual value), then the value of X would be 8.
While the equations for a given problem are typically obvious, the choice of variables may not be. Consider the following example (due to Hall (2004) ), showing that the choice of variables influences the causal analysis. Suppose that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy's rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy's would have shattered the bottle had Suzy not thrown.
In this case, a naive model might have an exogenous variable U that encapsulates whatever background factors cause Suzy and Billy to decide to throw the rock (the details of U do not matter, since we are interested only in the context where U 's value is such that both Suzy and Billy throw), a variable ST for Suzy throws (ST = 1 if Suzy throws, and ST = 0 if she doesn't), a variable BT for Billy throws, and a variable BS for bottle shatters. In the naive model, whose graph is given in Figure 1 , BS is 1 if one of ST and BT is 1. This causal model does not distinguish between Suzy and Billy's rocks hitting the bottle simultaneously and Suzy's rock hitting first. A more sophisticated model might also include variables SH and BH, for Suzy's rock hits the bottle and Billy's rock hits the bottle. Clearly BS is 1 iff one of SH and BH is 1. However, now, SH is 1 if ST is 1, and BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0. Thus, Billy's throw hits if Billy throws and Suzy's rock doesn't hit. This model is described by the following graph, where we implicitly assume a context where Suzy throws first, so there is an edge from SH to BH, but not one in the other direction (and omit the exogenous variable). Given a causal model M = (S, F ), a (possibly empty) vector X of variables in V, and a vector x of values for the variables in X, we define a new causal model, denoted M X← x , which is identical to M , except that the equation for the variables X in F is replaced by X = x. Intuitively, this is the causal model that results when the variables in X are set to x by some external action that affects only the variables in X (and overrides the effects of the causal equations). For example, if M is the more sophisticated model for the rock-throwing example, then M ST ←0 is the model where Suzy doesn't throw.
Given a signature S = (U, V, R), a formula of the form
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events;
• Y 1 , . . . , Y k are distinct variables in V; and A causal formula is a Boolean combination of basic causal formulas.
A causal formula ϕ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. We write
if the variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with recursive models) solution to the equations in M Y ← y in context u (i.e., the unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations F Y ← y Z , Z ∈ V − Y , with the variables in U set to u). We extend the definition to arbitrary causal formulas in the obvious way.
Causality
We now review the updated HP definition of causality.
Definition 2.1 X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M, u) if the following three conditions hold: to the fact that X = x is a cause of ϕ.
AC2. There exist a partition
If X is a singleton, then X = x is said to be a singleton cause of ϕ in (M, u).
AC1 just says that A cannot be a cause of B unless both A and B are true. The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally, the variables in Z should be thought of as describing the "active causal process" from X to ϕ. These are the variables that mediate between X and ϕ. AC2(a) is reminiscent of the traditional counterfactual criterion, according to which X = x is a cause of ϕ if changing the value of X results in ϕ being false. However, AC2(a) is more permissive than the traditional criterion; it allows the dependence of ϕ on X to be tested under special structural contingencies, in which the variables W are held constant at some setting w. AC2(b) is an attempt to counteract the "permissiveness" of AC2(a) with regard to structural contingencies. Essentially, it ensures that X alone suffices to bring about the change from ϕ to ¬ϕ; setting W to w merely eliminates spurious side effects that tend to mask the action of X.
To understand the role of AC2(b), consider the rockthrowing example again. Let M be the model in Figure 1 , and let u be the context where both Suzy and Billy throw. It is easy to see that both Suzy and Billy are causes of the bottle shattering in (M, u): Let Z = {ST, BS}, and consider the structural contingency where Billy doesn't throw (BT = 0).
, so Suzy is a cause of the bottle shattering. A symmetric argument shows that Billy is also a cause.
But now consider the model M ′ described in Figure 2 ; again, u is the context where both Suzy and Billy throw. It is still the case that Suzy is a cause of the bottle shattering in (M ′ , u). We can take W = {BT} and again consider the contingency where Billy doesn't throw. However, Billy is not a cause of the bottle shattering in (M ′ , u). For suppose that we now take W = {ST} and consider the contingency where Suzy doesn't throw. Clearly AC2(a) holds, since if Billy doesn't throw (under this contingency), then the bottle doesn't shatter. However, AC2(b) does not hold. Since BH ∈ Z, if we set BH to 0 (its original value), then AC2(b)
, but this is not the case. Similar arguments show that no other choice of ( Z, W ) makes Billy's throw a cause of the bottle shattering in (M ′ , u). The original HP definition differs from the updated definition in only one respect. Rather than requiring that
′ of W , it was required to hold only for W . That is, the following condition was used instead of AC2(b).
AC2(b
The requirement for AC2(b) to hold for all subsets of W in the updated definition prevents situations where W "conceals other causes for ϕ". The role of this requirement is perhaps best understood by considering the following example, due to Hopkins and Pearl (2003) (the description is taken from (Halpern & Pearl 2005) ): Suppose that a prisoner dies either if A loads B's gun and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun. Taking D to represent the prisoner's death and making the obvious assumptions about the meaning of the variables, we have that D = (A ∧ B) ∨ C. Suppose that in the actual context u, A loads B's gun, B does not shoot, but C does load and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies. That is, A = 1, B = 0, and C = 1. Clearly C = 1 is a cause of D = 1. We would not want to say that A = 1 is a cause of D = 1, given that B did not shoot (i.e., given that B = 0). However, with AC2(b ′ ), A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. For we can take W = {B, C} and consider the contingency where B = 1 and C = 0. It is easy to check that AC2(a) and AC2(b ′ ) hold for this contingency, so under the original HP definition, A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. However, AC2(b) fails in this case, since
The key point is that AC2(b) says that for A = 1 to be a cause of D = 1, it must be the case that D = 0 if only some of the values in W are set to w. That means that the other variables get the same value as they do in the actual context; in this case, by setting only A to 1 and leaving B unset, B takes on its original value of 0, in which case D = 0. AC2(b ′ ) does not consider this case. Using AC2(b) rather than AC2(b ′ ) has been shown to have a significant benefit (and to lead to more intuitive results) when causality is applied to program verification, with the goal of understanding what in the code is the cause of a program not satisfying its specification (Beer et al. 2012) .
Relevant Complexity Classes
In this section, we briefly recall the definitions of the complexity classes that we need for our results, and define the complexity class D 
We now define the classes D P k as follows. Definition 3.1 For k = 1, 2, . . .,
For k = 1, the class D P 1 is the well-known complexity class D P , defined by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1984) . It contains exact problems such as the language of pairs G, k , where G is a graph that has a maximal clique of size exactly k. As usual, we say that a language L is D 
The following lemma provides a useful condition sufficient for a language to be D
to L 1 , and let g be a polynomial-time reduction from L ′ 2 to L 2 (the existence of such reductions f and g follows from the fact that L 1 and L 2 are Σ P k -complete and Π P k -complete, respectively). Then, f, g is a polynomialtime reduction from L ′ 3 to L 3 , as required.
Essentially the same argument shows that if
Determining whether X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M, u) is a decision problem: we define a language and try to determine whether a particular tuple is in that language. (See Section 4 for the formal definition.) Determining degree of responsibility and blame is a different type of problem, since we are determining which number represents the degree of responsibility (resp., blame). Formally, these are function problems. For ease of exposition, we restrict attention to functions from some strings over some fixed language Σ to strings over Σ (i.e., we are considering functions from Σ * to Σ * ). For a complexity class A in the polynomial hierarchy, FP A[log n] consists of all functions that can be computed by a polynomial-time Turing machine with an A-oracle which on input x asks a total of O(log |x|) queries (Papadimitriou 1984) . 
Complexity for the Updated HP Definition
In this section, we prove our results on the complexity of deciding causality. We start by defining the problem formally. In the definitions, M stands for a causal model, u is a context, X is a subset of variables of M , and x is the set of values of X in (M, u):
is a cause of ϕ in (M, u)}.
One of our goals is to understand the cause of the complexity of computing causality. Towards this end, it is useful to define two related languages:
L AC2 = { M, u, ϕ, X, x : ( X = x) satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2 of Def. 2.1 for ϕ in (M, u)}, L AC3 = { M, u, ϕ, X, x : ( X = x) satisfies conditions AC1 and AC3 of Def. 2.1 for ϕ in (M, u)}.
It is easy to see that
cause be the subset of L cause where X and x are singletons; this is the singleton causality problem. We can
; for singleton causality, the minimality condition AC3 trivially holds.
We denote by L B cause the language of causality for binary causal models (i.e., where the models M in the tuple are binary models), and by L 
AC2 .
We start by considering singleton causality. As we observed, Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002) and Hopkins (2001) showed that, with the original HP definition, singleton causality and causality coincide. However, for the updated definition, Halpern (2008) showed that it is in fact possible to have minimal causes that are not singletons. Thus, we consider singleton causality and general causality separately. We can clarify where the complexity lies by considering L AC2 (and its sublanguages) and L AC3 (and its sublanguages) separately.
AC2 , and L
Proof outline: To show all these languages are in Σ P , given a tuple M, u, ϕ, X, x , checking that AC1 holds, that is, checking that (M, u) |= X = x ∧ ϕ, can be done in time polynomial in the size of M , | X|, and |ϕ| (the length of ϕ as a string of symbols). For AC2, we need only guess the set W and the assignment w. The check that assigning w to W and x ′ to X indeed falsifies ϕ is polynomial, and we use an NP oracle to check that for all subsets of W and all subsets of Z, condition AC2(b) holds. (The argument is quite similar to Eiter and Lukasiewicz's argument that causality is in Σ AC2 . We leave details to the appendix.
Since, as we have observed, AC3 is vacuous in the case of singleton causality, it follows that singleton causality is Σ AC3 are in Π P 2 is straightforward. Again, given a tuple M, u, ϕ, X, x , we can check that AC1 holds in polynomial time. For AC3, we need to check that for all strict subsets X ′ of X, AC2 fails.
Since checking AC2 is in Σ P 2 , checking that it fails is in Π P 2 . Checking that it fails for all strict subsets X ′ keeps it in Π P 2 (since it just adds one more universal quantifier).
To prove that these languages are Π P 2 -hard, we show that we can reduce Π
. The proof is similar in spirit to the proof of Theorem 4.1; we leave details to the appendix.
We are now ready to prove our main result. The fact that there may be more than one conjunct in a cause using the updated HP definition means that checking AC3 becomes nontrivial, and causes the increase in complexity for Σ P 2 to D P 2 . But why is there no dropoff with the updated HP definition when we restrict to binary models, although there is a dropoff from Σ P 2 to NP for the original HP definition? To prove their NP-completeness result, Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002) showed that for binary models, with the original HP definition, the set Z and its subsets can be omitted from the definition of cause. That is, we can replace
to get an equivalent definition. The example that a cause may require more than one conjunct given by Halpern (2008) shows that removing Z and its subsets from AC2(b) does not result in an equivalent definition in binary models. But even if it did, the fact that we need to quantify over all subset W ′ of W in AC2(b) would be enough to ensure that there is no dropoff in complexity in binary models.
Responsibility and Blame
In this section, we review the definitions of responsibility and blame and characterize their complexity. See Chockler and Halpern (2004) for more intuition and details.
Responsibility
The definition of responsibility given by Chockler and Halpern (2004) was given based on the original HP definition of causality, and thus assumed that causes were always single conjuncts. It is straightforward to extend it to allow causes to have arbitrarily many conjuncts. Intuitively, dr((M, u), ( X = x), ϕ) measures the minimal number of changes that have to be made in u in order to make ϕ counterfactually depend on X, provided the conditions on the subsets of W and Z are satisfied (see also the voting example from the introduction). If there is no partition of V to ( Z, W ) that satisfies AC2, or ( X = x) does not satisfy AC3 for ϕ in (M, u), then the minimal number of changes in u in Definition 5.1 is taken to have cardinality ∞, and thus the degree of responsibility of ( X = x) is 0 (and hence it is not a cause).
Definition 5.1 The degree of responsibility of
In the original HP model, it was shown that computing responsibility is FP NP[log n] -complete in binary causal models (Chockler, Halpern, & Kupferman 2008) and FP Σ P 2 [log n] -complete in general causal models (Chockler & Halpern 2004) .
We now characterize the complexity of computing responsibility in the updated HP definition. 
Theorem 5.2 Computing the degree of responsibility is FP

Proof outline:
The proof is quite similar to the proof in (Chockler & Halpern 2004) . We prove membership by describing an algorithm in FP Σ P 2 [log n] for computing the degree of responsibility. Roughly speaking, the algorithm queries an oracle for the language R = {( (M, u), (X = x), ϕ, i such that (M, u), (X = x), ϕ ∈ L cause and the degree of responsibility of (X = x) for ϕ is at least i}. It is easy to see that R is in Σ P 2 by using Corollary 4.2. The algorithm for computing the degree of responsibility performs a binary search on the value of dr((M, u), (X = x), ϕ), each time dividing the range of possible values for the degree of responsibility by 2 according to the answer of R. The number of possible candidates for the degree of responsibility is bounded by the size of the input n, and thus the number of queries is at most ⌈log n⌉.
For hardness in binary causal models (which implies hardness in general causal models), we provide a reduction from the Σ Proof outline: Membership in FP D2[log n] is shown in quite a similar way to Theorem 5.2. For hardness, as there are no known natural problems complete in FP D2[log n] , the proof proceeds by constructing a generic reduction from a problem in FP D2[log n] to the degree of responsibility.
Blame
The definition of blame addresses the situation where there is uncertainty about the true situation or "how the world works". Blame, introduced in (Chockler & Halpern 2004) , considers the "true situation" to be determined by the context, and "how the world works" to be determined by the structural equations. An agent's uncertainty is modeled by a pair (K, Pr), where K is a set of pairs of the form (M, u), where M is a causal model and u is a context, and Pr is a probability distribution over K. A pair (M, u) is called a situation. We think of K as describing the situations that the agent considers possible before X is set to x. The degree of blame that setting X to x has for ϕ is then the expected degree of responsibility of X = x for ϕ in (M X← x , u), taken over the situations (M, u) ∈ K. Note that the situation (M X← x , u) for (M, u) ∈ K are those that the agent considers possible after X is set to x.
Definition 5. 4 The degree of blame of setting X to x for ϕ relative to epistemic state (K, Pr), denoted db(K, Pr, X ← x, ϕ), is
For the original HP definition of cause, Chockler and Halpern (2004) show that computing the degree of blame is complete in FP 
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
As we oberved in the main part of the paper, membership is straightforward, so we focus here on hardness. For hardness, we describe a reduction from the language Σ 2 (SAT) to L B,1 AC2 . In the process, we work with both propositional formulas with propositional variables, and causal formulas, that use formulas like X = 1 and X = 0. We can think of X as a propositional variable here, where X = 1 denotes that X is true, and X = 0 denotes that x is false. If ϕ is a propositional formula, let ϕ be the causal formula that results by replacing each occurrence of a propositional variable X by X = 1.
Given a CQBF ∃ X∀ Y ϕ, consider the tuple (M, u, ψ, A, 0) where M = (U, V, R) is a binary causal model and • U = {U };
where A is a fresh variable that does not appear in X or Y ;
• for all variables V ∈ V, the structural equation is V = U (i.e. all the variables in V are set to the value of U ); • u = 0;
• ψ = ψ 1 ∨ (ψ 2 ∧ ψ 3 ) where ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 are the following causal formulas:
of replacing each occurrence of a variable X ∈ X by X 1 ).
We prove that ∃ X∀ Y ϕ = true iff A = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M, u) (which is the case iff (M, u, ψ, A, 0) ∈ L B,1 AC2 , since AC3 is vacuous for binary models).
First suppose that ∃ X∀ Y ϕ = true. To show that A = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M, u), we prove that AC1 and AC2 hold.
Clearly AC1 holds: (M, u) |= A = 0 by the definition of F A , and (M, u) |= ψ since (M, u) |= ψ 1 , again by the definition of F .
For AC2, let W = V − {A}. and define w as follows. Let τ be an assignment to the variables in X for which ∀ Y ϕ = true. Using w(X) to denote the value of X according to w, we require that • w(X τ (X) ) = 1;
• w(X 1−τ (X) ) = 0; and
(since w assigns different values to X 0 and X 1 for all X ∈ X) and, since w(
It now remains to show that AC2(b) holds. Fix
ψ, we focus on the latter from here on in.
If
It follows that, for each variable X ∈ X, we have that
). To see this, note that if τ (X) = 1, then we must have X 1 ∈ W ′ ; otherwise, we
showing that AC2(b) holds. Finally, we must show that if A = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M, u) then ∃ X∀ Y ϕ = true. 1 As usual, we take X 0 = X 1 to be an abbreviation for the causal formula
So suppose that A = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M, u). Then there exists a witness ( W , w, a). Since we are considering binary models, we must have a = 1, so we have
This implies that
Define τ so that τ (X) = b, where b ∈ {0, 1} is the unique value for which
It follows that Y ∈ W and w(Y ) = 1 for all y ∈ Y . Now let ν be an assignment to X and Y such that ν| X = τ . It cleary suffices to show that ϕ is true under assignment
all the variables X b that are in W , and all the variables Y ∈ Y for which ν(Y ) = 1.
Note that, for Y ∈ Y w(Y ) = 1 iff ν(Y ) = 1; moreover, w(X 1 ) = 1 iff τ (X) = 1 iff ν(X) = 1. Thus, the fact that (M, u) |= [ W ′ ← w]ψ 3 implies that ϕ is satisfied by ν, so we are done.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
B Proof of Theorem 4.3
Again, as we oberved in the main part of the paper, membership is straightforward, so we focus on hardness. We describe a reduction from the language Π 2 (SAT) to L B AC3 , which suffices to prove the result. The argument is similar in spirit to that for Theorem 4.1.
Given a CQBF ∀ Y ∃ Xϕ, consider the tuple (M, u, ψ, A 1 , A 2 , 0, 0 ) where M = (U, V, R) is a binary causal model and • U = {U };
, S}, where A 1 , A 2 , and S are fresh variables;
• the structural equations for A 1 and A 2 are A 1 = S and A 2 = S, and, for all other variables V ∈ V, the equation is V = U ;
We prove that To show that AC3 holds, we need to show that neither A 1 = 0 nor A 2 = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M, u). We prove that A 1 = 0 is not a cause of ψ in (M, u) ; the argument for A 2 = 0 not being a cause is identical.
It suffices to prove that AC2 does not hold. So suppose by way of contradiction that ( W , w, 1) is a witness for A 1 being a cause of ψ in (M, u). Since AC2(a) holds, we must have (As we observed above, exactly one of these two cases occurs, so ν is well defined.) By assumption, ∀ Y ∃ Xϕ = true, so there exists an assignment τ to X that makes ϕ true if the assignment to Y is determined by ν.
We again show that AC2(b) does not hold. Let Z ′ = ∅ and let W ′ = W − {X : τ (X) = 0}. Since S ∈ W ′ and w(S) = 1, it is easy to see that in both case • w(S) = 1;
• w(X) = 1 for all X ∈ X;
• w(Y ν(y) ) = 1 and w(Y 1−ν(y) ) = 0 for all Y ∈ Y .
Since AC3 holds, A 1 ← 0 cannot be a cause of ψ in (M, u) with witness ( W , w, 1). It is straightforward to check that (M, u) |= [A 1 ← 1, W ← w]¬ψ, using the fact that w(S) = 1. Hence, AC2(a) holds for A 1 ← 0. AC3 holds trivially, and we have already observed that A1 holds. 
